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Abstract
Referring to the films Avatar (2009) and Cloud Atlas (2012),
the author will demonstrate that a new era of metaphysical
holism follows Postmodernism. These films celebrate a
resurrection of the flesh with 3-D technology and a
reincarnation of souls with the aesthetic technique of
morphing. However apocalyptic their visions of the future
might be, and however much they might seem to worship
technical megalomania, they are also and again conveying a
resounding ethical message and a taste of Utopia.
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1. Post-Postmodernism

Site Map

We remember it well. It all started in 1979 with a text entitled,
La condition postmoderne, written by Jean-François Lyotard.
It was this text that gave Postmodernism an ambiguous status
that it has never really been able to since shake off, a status
somewhere between a buzzword and a concept. As a concept,
it appears as a linguistically expressed unit for a plurality of
phenomena. As a buzzword, it expresses no more than a
general humming or murmuring and, for precisely this reason,
is able to function falsely as a universal key to all manner of
doors. As Lyotard mentioned in the first lines of his text, the
word was already in use in the late 1970s, having crystallized
in the American literary criticism of the late 1950s and gained
tentative popularity within the context of 1970s architecture.
As a criterion to distinguish between Modernism and
Postmodernism, Lyotard introduced the term “grand narrative”
or “meta-narrative.” Accordingly, whereas Modernism primarily
draws upon three of these grand narratives, “dialectics of
spirit,” “hermeneutics of meaning,” and “emancipation of the
rational or working subject,” Postmodernism distances itself
from these legitimation strategies. Lyotard also noted here,
however, that this definition of Postmodernism is only viable
when “simplifying to the extreme.”[1]
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For more than two decades, Postmodernism has defined the
cultural discussion as a concept and a buzzword. Hardly
anyone would disagree that the above-mentioned grand
narratives have, indeed, lost their powers of legitimation or, at
least, had their powers weakened. Yet, at the same time,
neither would they disagree that, on the one hand, new grand
narratives have replaced the old and, on the other hand,
certain meta-narratives have never ceased to have an impact
in the cause of classical metaphysics. At this point we need
only to remind ourselves of the latest manifestations in the toand-fro of philosophical theory, “New Realism” and
“Speculative Materialism,” patently intended in the PostPostmodernist generation to satisfy a need to return to

something concrete, something real, even a thing-in-itself
amongst all the endless symbolic chains of signs. In the
English-speaking world, in other words, the analytical
philosophy of the present, metaphysics is also hugely popular
as a response to questions with a maximum degree of
generalization.[2] In addition, it was inevitable that
Postmodernism had to establish itself as a meta-narrative if it
was going to be successful. As Lyotard himself says, its
emphasis on the plurality of types of discourse or, to quote
Wittgenstein, “language games,” takes its lead from the
“general rule” or meta-narrative: “let us play…and let us play
in peace.”[3]
New grand narratives are also emerging in the areas of
literature and film. If, as I shall do in the following, one
restricts oneself to film, then here it is true that cinema
experts and film critics have never really felt at ease with the
term "Postmodernism." While in Germany the discussion has
been riddled with corresponding “aversions,” in the U.S. the
opposite has been the case. There, film studies have been
dominated by Postmodern thinking to such an extent that it
“tends to hinder the precise examination of cinematic objects
rather than promote it.”[4]
Since the mid-1990s, however, the situation has changed
conspicuously. Postmodernism is out. Instead, focus is once
more on the whole, with totality reinstated as an honorable
term. And this has also meant the unforeseen return of
metaphysics with proclaimed “postmetaphysical thinking” and
worldviews influenced by popular philosophy.[5] I would like
to speak about this phenomenon with the aid of two fairly
recent films, Avatar (2009) and Cloud Atlas (2012). If general
conclusions were permissible, a new era of metaphysical
holism could be proclaimed. And even at the level of cinematic
theorization, religious-metaphysical claims can still be heard.
For cinema is celebrating a resurrection of the flesh with 3-D
technology and a reincarnation of souls with the aesthetic
technique of morphing. However apocalyptic its visions of the
future might be, and however much it might seem to worship
technical megalomania, it is also and again conveying a
resounding ethical message and a taste of Utopia.
2. Avatar and the resurrection of the flesh
Digital technology has perfected cinema into what it was
intended to be from the outset: an imagination realization
machine. The latest outstanding example of this is Avatar. Its
plot is quickly related.
Jake Sully, a former U.S. soldier, is on his way to a planet
bearing the allusive name “Pandora,” well known to us from
Greek mythology. He is undertaking this mission in the place
of his twin brother, a scientist who has died. Since the two
brothers share the same genes, the one brother can seemingly
take over from the other brother. This metaphor is misplaced,
however, because Jake has been paralyzed from the hips
down and confined to a wheelchair since his wartime
deployment. His brother had been working for a concern (the
RDA) that went to Pandora to mine a sought-after raw
material with the ironically telling name of unobtainium, in
other words, something beyond reach. The planet is similar to
Earth but the indigenous humanoid species, the so-called

Na’vi, phenotypically a blue-skinned cross between a
predatory cat and a human being, and the plants, trees and
animals are all much larger. Also, their habitat is as dense as a
tropical rainforest, and just a few minutes in its atmosphere is
enough to poison human beings not wearing oxygen masks.
The team of scientists is on a mission to make contact with
the indigenous people and persuade them to leave their home
so that the RDA will be free to exploit the raw material. In
order to make this contact, artificial Na’vi bodies have been
created, so-called avatars, that can be controlled as soon as
they are matched to a human brain. Scientists then have
power over the thought transfer process. The real human body
is placed in a kind of sarcophagus while its personal identity is
transferred to one of these artificial bodies.[6] For Jake, this is
a liberating experience because he can now feel his legs again,
run around as much as he likes and, standing upright, dig his
toes into the soft soil.
Out working in the forest, Jake manages to lose contact with
the scientific team. A Na’vi warrior and daughter of the Na’vi
chieftain, Neytiri, could easily kill him but decides not to at the
last minute when she notices a divine sign from nature, a kind
of plankton hovering through the air in the shape of a small,
transparent, fluorescent jellyfish. After some hesitation, the
Na’vi decide to accept the stranger into their circle and get to
know him and his species better. For the same reason, the
human beings also decide that Jake should seize this
opportunity. The military, which calls the Na’vi “blue monkeys”
(an allusion to the musical film The Wizard of Oz from 1939),
is particularly interested in spying on the indigenous
population and learning more about it. Thus Jake becomes an
agent, officially for the scientists, but unofficially for the
military.
He learns the language of the Na’vi and participates in their
rituals. He learns to shoot with a bow and arrow, to ride
horses and, finally, and the high point of his socialization
process and also a stereoscopic visual climax for the audience,
to tame a flying lizard and take it on hunting trips through the
skies. He and Neytiri become a couple. But the situation
escalates when the RDA and the military ultimately opt for
violence and crush the Na’vi habitat with their bombastic
arsenal of firearms. This is the deciding moment, also for Jake.
He defects, and becomes the leader of a successful resistance
movement. In the end, only one step remains to be taken,
and that is to leave behind his human body for good and lose
himself completely in his artificial body, his avatar. He
manages this step as well and becomes a Na’vi.
So much for the story. Viewed with the detachment of cultural
scientific analysis, it is not difficult to identify narrative
patterns intertwined with Western, but not only Western,
culture. Firstly, we have the pattern of integration in or, with a
more critical accent, colonization of cultures, popularly known
as the so-called Pocahontas motif. Pocahontas, the daughter
of an Indian chief, is said to have acted in the early
seventeenth century as a mediator between the Indians of
Virginia and the English colonists. According to one legend
started by the colonists themselves, she saved the life of an
English captain she had fallen in love with when her tribe tried

to kill him.[7] In cinema, the Pocahontas motif is constantly
being rejuvenated. In the past twenty years, there has been a
Walt Disney animation of the story (1995) and, as an
intellectual counterpart, a film adaptation by the philosopher
amongst film directors (or, in Heideggerian terms, the poetphilosopher), Terrence Malick (The New World, 2005). Kevin
Kostner used the same motif in Dances With Wolves (1990).
Against this background, a cinema critic writing about Avatar
was therefore justified in mocking, “Here’s the basic story in
one sentence: Dances With Wolves on another planet, and the
Indians win.”[8]
The Pocahontas story is interwoven with a narrative pattern
that is no less significant, that of the white savior. Accordingly,
indigenous peoples (in other words, colonial victims) need a
man of white race in order to be victorious in their battles
against this very race. Thus, they have the choice between
two types of cultural imperialism, cruel or benevolent, but they
will never be more than supporting actors in the bid for white
self-admiration.[9] In Avatar, Jake rises to become the leader
of all the native tribes at the precise moment when he
manages what no one has managed since the days of yore,
namely to ride on an enormous flying lizard. The gender
perspective throws a conciliatory light on the white male hero,
however. Our saviour is a Catholic one, so to speak, in that
without the woman by his side, he would be nothing.[10]
The most obvious narrative pattern in Avatar, however, is that
of the artificial human being. This pattern, to recall Lyotard,
can be analyzed as the intersection of three grand narratives
in Western culture: Christian religion, the natural sciences, and
bourgeois anthropology.[11] Tales of artificial human beings
are attractive in our culture because the creation of such a
being simultaneously has the appeal of the divinely forbidden,
is a project of scientific self-assurance, and allows the male
sex to dream about self-creation. This pattern is omnipresent
in the films of James Cameron, the director of Avatar. His
admiration and interest are entirely geared towards what nonhuman creatures are capable of, whether they be cyborgs (The
Terminator, 1984 and 1991), aliens (Aliens, 1986) or, now,
avatars. Formulated another way, the films reveal a lasting
desire “to leave the flesh of Homo sapiens behind for
something stronger and tougher.”[12]
In Avatar, anti- and trans-humanistic desire shows itself in
different ways. For example, the colors of the human world are
fairly monotonous grays and blues, whereas the Na’vi world is
resplendent. At the plot level, the human being dies at the
moment he reawakens as a humanoid creature, an anthropoid.
On his birthday, Jake goes to the tree of souls, the holiest
place for the Na’vi, a kind of lofty weeping willow whose
branch-like formations shine like light-conducting cables. The
tree grants access to that divine power of nature that the Na’vi
call “Eywa.” In a ceremony accompanied by prayer, singing,
and rhythmic body movements, Jake’s human body is laid out
next to his avatar. The fine roots of the mossy soil wrap
around his body like fine hairs. Glowing plankton floats down
once more: the seeds from the tree of souls. Guided by the
camera, we slowly approach the face of the avatar until it fills
the screen. Its eyes open. The new Jake is born. The film ends
as it began, with an awakening. While it is disappointing at the

beginning when the semi-paralyzed man was dreaming he
could fly, this is not the case with the final awakening. Jake
had good reasons for his decision to renounce the old Adam.
This choice in Avatar has been criticized as an escape from
reality that is typical of its time. Whereas its cinematic role
model, The Wizard of Oz, has its main figure learn that
“there’s no place like home,” Jake learns that his previous
home is a world in demise. He learns that this reality is
dispensable,[13] and that what human beings call reality is
only one of several possible options. The ontology for which
Avatar pleads is physical-materialistic and holistic. Here, the
philosophy of posthumanism and the Christian theology of
resurrection undergo a surprising cross-connection. Their
message is that of the posthumanistic resurrection of the
flesh. Accordingly, the old Adam is not to be saved. Salvation
does not lie in the decay of the body and the continued
existence of the soul either, however. Far more, salvation is to
be found in a new, different body. Here, a posthumanistic
legacy of Christian theology continues to have an effect, a
legacy that ranges from Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Übermensch and Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” to Althusser’s
(Marxist-structuralistic) and Foucault’s (poststructuralistic)
antihumanism to Deleuze’s vision of a new vitalism and the
variants of so-called New Materialism.[14] To this extent,
Cameron’s Avatar provides the updated version of Luca
Signorelli’s mural from the Cathedral of Orvieto. Its
resurrection is, quite literally, one of the body, but it is no
longer one which belongs to the realm of humanity.
Admittedly, the resurrection of the flesh does not only take
place on the cinema screen. It is also performed in the cinema
or at home in the living room. All that one requires is a pair of
those dark plastic glasses that represent the modest technical
counterpart to stereoscopic recording technology. 3-D glasses
are, of course, an easily available prosthesis, only one small
and amusing step along the path towards a new, further
developed human being that one day will be technologically
transformed. But our fascination with this (newer, technically
perfected) 3-D cinema is about the intensity, in other words,
the degree of reality of this heightened cinema
experience.[15] To this extent, this new type of cinema can be
viewed without exaggeration as a precursor to anthropological
transformation. The cinematic experience, indeed experience
at all, is impossible without immersion. 3-D cinema,
specifically the one recently enhanced, perfects this
experience. As long as we are unable to immerse ourselves in
a new body, we instead immerse ourselves in an artificially
created world with the aid of glasses.[16]
The second aspect of the ontology found in Avatar is that of
natural philosophical and metaphysical holism. For the Na’vi,
nature is namely an inspirited totality, with the tree of souls
being its most visible symbol. It functions like an organic
storage platform where information and memories can be upand downloaded. It even facilitates communication with the
dead. For scientists from the terrestrial world this sounds
fantastic, in both senses of the word, as unreal as it is
magnificent, as crazy as it is wonderful. In the words of the
team leader (played by Sigourney Weaver with the same
resolute manner familiar from the Aliens films), “There is some

kind of electrochemical communication between the roots of
the trees, like the synapses between neurons ... That’s more
connections than the human brain ... It’s a network – a global
network.” The idea that there could be a planet with nature
organized analogously to the human brain, that (in apparent
ethical generalization) nature could be organized like the
human brain at all—this is an idea that, understandably,
fascinates the realm of science.[17] And philosophy, not only
that of so-called posthumanism in this case, but also of
rationalism, at least in the variation associated with Spinoza.
His general metaphysical theory, as we know, was that reality
does not, as claimed by Descartes, consist of two substances
(res cogitans and res extensa, ultimately held together by a
third substance, namely God) but of a single, infinite
substance, which Spinoza calls “deus sive natura.” His
metaphysical monism is the philosophical role model for the
holistic worldview in Avatar, even if the ecology and New Age
movements from the 1970s are more obvious.
A philosophical differentiation must certainly be made between
monism and holism. Spinoza is usually viewed as representing
monism but in more recent decades his most influential
interpreter, Gilles Deleuze, was able to reinstate it
philosophically. This was partly because he forcefully
reinterpreted the monistic principle according to a theory of
difference, reading Spinoza through the eyes of Nietzsche, so
to speak. Being is “univocal,” meaning it is the same for all
differences or modalities, “but these modalities are not the
same.”[18] The term that, according to Deleuze and also for
Spinoza, is central to dissolving this paradoxical relationship, ,
is that of ‘expression.’[19] Substance is namely expressed in
its attributes, thought, and extension, and the attributes are,
in turn, expressed in the modes dependent on them. Each
mode or, in other words, each individual appearance of a
physical-extended or mental kind, has both attributes. Each
matter, for example, a tree or a stone, thus has a spiritual
side. Everything is inspirited. However, since we are limited in
our intellectuality, we cannot perceive this panpsychism.
Deleuze does not hesitate in declaring the rationalist Spinoza a
representative of “transcendental empiricism” or, in other
words, of a philosophy that replaces a being identifiable in
statements with a being of associations, conjunctions, and
relations, that is, “thinking with et not est,” whereby in this
context the irony lies in the fact that almost only “Englishmen
and Americans” think that way.[20] In this sense, Deleuze
represents a hypothetical holism on the philosophical basis of
an imaginary coupling of Spinoza and Nietzsche, a holism
which then celebrates itself in the coupling orgies of the AntiOedipus (1972), in the philosophical concept of the “rhizome”
(1976) and a “body without organs.”[21]
For Deleuze, holism is therefore a hypothetically conceived,
paradoxical synthesis of monism and pluralism.[22] By this he
means a metaphysical and natural philosophical principle,
according to which organic and an organic nature are not
deemed to be a mechanistically explicable realm of isolated
bodies and things but internally, with their own composite
parts, and externally, with the environment, interacting forms
of being.[23] In the case of Avatar, this principle naturally
presents itself in a popularized form, we are talking about a
mainstream Hollywood film, after all, and not an academic

book from Oxford or Paris,but that does not mean we cannot
take it seriously.
3. Cloud Atlas and the reincarnation of the souls
Holism is also the philosophical-metaphysical theme of Cloud
Atlas. However, it is finer, more rhizomatic, so to speak. Cloud
Atlas is not science fiction but a multi-genre film that also has
a science fiction part. It includes six different parts in total
each with its own genre: a seafaring adventure film set
against the political background of the slave trade in the midnineteenth century; a love story and artistic drama set in the
mid-1930s; a political thriller involving atomic energy set in
the 1970s; a comedy about a publisher locked up in an old
people’s home set in present-day Great Britain; a science
fiction film set in (neo) Seoul in the twenty-second century;
and, finally, a fantasy film set another two hundred years
later, which brings together a high-tech civilization and an
archaic life form. The crucial question is obviously how all of
these parts can be linked in some way to create a unity out of
multiplicity.
The original novel by David Mitchell answers this question
relatively simply. It tells the six stories one after the other but
each one only halfway through, adding the second halves in a
reverse chronology. It thus begins with the story from 1848,
stops halfway through, jumps to the story from 1936, stops
again and so on through the remaining stories.
Chronologically, the zenith is the last story from 2321. This
one is told in both its halves, all the way through to the end,
before the other stories are then also each told to the end in
reverse order.[24] Beyond this formal structure, it also
employs internal references. Persons from one story play a
role in the next. A diary or some love letters from one story
are found in another. Each of the protagonists in the six
stories also has a birthmark that looks like a comet, an almost
blatant symbol of reincarnation, an idea that runs through
both the novel and the film.
Also blatant are some linking epigrams, such as: “Our lives are
not our own. From womb to tomb, we are bound to others.
Past and present. And by each crime and every kindness, we
birth our future.” Holism thus receives a social, historical and,
beyond these, political accent when replying to the defeatist
prognosis, “No matter what you do it will never amount to
anything more than a single drop in a limitless ocean,” both
rhetorically and tellingly: “What is an ocean but a multitude of
drops?”
The situation becomes far more complicated in the film
because here the construction is not a relatively small number
of chapters. Instead, the film breaks down the different
sections to such an extent that a schematic, fixed structure is
no longer recognizable. There are still the six stories and
cross-references between the six, but in the film the
kaleidoscopic principle wrapping the stories around an axis of
symmetry is no longer realized tangibly but in a purely
aesthetic manner and, as a result, infinitely more sophistically.
The many shattered pieces, both smaller and larger fragments,
emerge in a moving, symmetrical, kaleidoscopic pattern that
achieves its own equilibrium. To use a different comparison, we
are reminded of Piet Mondrian’s compositions with their

coloured rectangular forms. The symmetry that is present in
the film is therefore, in more precise terms, the imaginary
result of a rhythmic and dynamic order. The most obvious
comparison, however, is with Mondrian’s “Broadway Boogie
Woogie” (1942/43), for Cloud Atlas is enormously musical in
its construction. There is an admirable amount of sensitivity to
rhythm and momentum in the film, almost as if the makers,
primarily Tom Tykwer, wished to make a cineastic reference to
the “girl with kaleidoscope eyes” from the song by the Beatles,
“Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds.”[25]
A short version of this constructional principle is provided by
the film’s opening sequence. An old man is sitting by a fire
under a night sky of stars or the Milky Way. It is Zachry (Tom
Hanks), a goatherd and simple man, in 2321. He tells of the
first time he and the Devil, whom he colloquially calls “old
Georgie,” met “eye to eye.” The narrating voice changes. It is
now that of a young man, a traveller in the South Pacific in
1849. Chronologically we have therefore jumped from the last
to the first story. For the first time, this young man meets the
doctor who will later give him poison instead of medicine in
order to get at his money. This doctor is also played by Tom
Hanks. The linking of the two scenes suggests that this doctor
from 1849 is the Devil of whom the goatherd will speak or
spoke to in 2321.
Since the doctor and the goatherd, the Devil and his
adversary, are played by the same person, it is hard to know
what to make of these associations. At the precise moment
when the doctor looks into the young man’s eyes, the film cuts
to the 1970s and the story of a young reporter (Halle Berry)
who has uncovered an atomic energy scandal and put her own
life in danger. This is chronologically the third story. But before
it can develop any further, a male narrator can be heard once
again and we are transported, carried by background music
and the tapping keys of a typewriter, into another story, that
of an aging publisher (Jim Broadbent) in Great Britain, in 2012,
who is busy writing his memoirs in this scene. This means we
are already at the end of his story, story number 4.
We then go back in time again, this time to the 1930s. The
name of the man we have just heard the reporter utter,
Sixsmith, is now uttered by a young man, a composer, who
has just written him a letter, a suicide note. On the desk in
front of him there are music scores headed, “The Cloud Atlas
Symphony” and “The Cloud Atlas Sextet.” The young man is
about to shoot himself. The story leading up to this suicide will
be presented to the viewers later on. This story, number 2,
has therefore also begun at its end. At the moment when the
young man releases the safety catch on his revolver, a
(dividing) cut and a (linking) clicking sound transport us into
the next story, story no. 5. Handcuffs are being placed around
the wrists of a young woman dressed entirely in white and
sitting opposite a man dressed in black. An interrogation. We
find ourselves in Neo-Seoul in the twenty-second century.
The film then runs through all the stories one more time in a
relatively rapid, albeit different sequence (stories 3 and 4, then
1, 5 and 2). Before the young composer takes his own life, an
abrupt cut takes us to the meta-level of the film. The title,
“Cloud Atlas,” appears. Now the briefly introduced and

intertangled narratives can unfold.
Cloud Atlas plays quite openly with the idea of reincarnation,
familiar to us from the Hindu and Buddhist religions and
philosophies.[26] But I would like to stress here that it is only
playing. Looking at the individual stories, it is certainly
possible to establish that their characters are “onedimensional,” the moral of the story “crude” and that the
“overly complicated plot puzzle” is intended to draw a veil over
this deficit.[27] Particularly with a view to the technical art
form of cinema, one can add that, once again, all we have
here is the “exhibition” of a cinema that “‘morphs’ ideas
through pictures and actions” but results only in a half-baked
mixture of esotericism, Sunday school and semi-digested
nuggets of philosophy.”[28] Nevertheless, Cloud Atlas also
provides unadulterated evidence of that old Aristotelian thesis
constantly being updated by philosophers, namely that the
whole is more than the sum of its parts. For it contains very
much not only parts, but also and especially relationships
among them.
In the case of Cloud Atlas, these relationships are governed by
an aesthetic, kaleidoscopic principle that is directed not at the
six stories themselves but at individual scenes from them. It is
a film of scenic groupings on the basis of a morphing
technique. Links between scenes are accordingly produced
through a third, interspersed image or, more generally, a
common visual or acoustic element. This might be a voiceover,
a musical theme, a sound (such as the clicking of a revolver or
of handcuffs), a sound combined with two different, yet similar
images (you can, for example, see and hear a hand knocking
at a wooden door, which then opens onto a different story), or
finally, the playing of different roles by one and the same
actor or actress, even across different sexes and races. Last,
but not least, the film, like the novel, is characterized by an
ironic undertone. The devout earnestness with which some
figures propound tenets from the broad reservoir of
metaphysical-religious holism is thwarted by other figures
uttering statements such as, “far too hippie-druggy-new
age.”[29] At the end it even becomes clear that the film has
also been a bedtime story for children, as we, the viewers, are
shown that old Zachry has been telling his story not only to us
but also to a group of children gathered around him.
4. Cultural diagnosis and hypothesis game
At the beginning of this essay I included a reminder about the
postmodern theory of the demise of grand narratives. By way
of contrast, films like Avatar and Cloud Atlas, and at this point
it is also imperative to include The Tree of Life by Terrence
Malick (2011), no longer display the slightest bashfulness in
unfolding their stories against a background of grand narrative
theories.[30] In cultural diagnostic terms, these films are
therefore certainly significant. They help us to name, or at
least find one name for, the age succeeding Postmodernism.
For Cloud Atlas, however, the status of grand narrative theory
can be relativized. The ironic particles embedded in the film
and its aesthetic constructional principle, which can be
described using the terms kaleidoscope and morphing, mean
that it can be linked to a master of Postmodernist thought and
writing, namely Jacques Derrida. His program, metaphysics,

the idea of the one replaced by pluralistic dissolution, bringing
forth several simultaneous texts through interpretation and
style of writing, finds a worthy cineastic successor in Cloud
Atlas. To this extent Cloud Atlas is perhaps a Post-Postmodern
film in the best sense, Postmodern in its structure, but PostPostmodern in its grand metaphysical narrative. Independent
from this, however, it demonstrates that metaphysical holism
can be justified provisionally and, with relish, aesthetically. Of
course in science, and especially in philosophy, we must not
forget that even an obscure, completely contra-intuitive view
can, in time, prove to be a fruitful hypothesis. The hypothesis
of metaphysical holism can therefore continue to hope for
empirical reinforcement.[31]
In the interim, this hypothesis can receive support in the
aesthetic context. Metaphysical holism is here dependent on a
semantic holism, however. Semantics jumps in, so to speak,
as a justificatory authority in metaphysical matters. It can only
bring this justification, of course, in an analogizing sense. (In a
symbolic system A is to B what C is to D in a metaphysical
system). In the context of aesthetics, semantics can emerge
as a justificatory authority because here it presents itself as a
holistic system. In a work of art (a holistic-semantic system),
or a film claiming to be highly aesthetic, such as Cloud Atlas,
it can then appear as if “being” were only another word for
“connectedness,” to such an extent that evidence for this
semblance is acknowledged to exist. We enjoy ourselves in
aesthetic play with a hypothesis. To put it slightly differently,
if, as in the case of nature or the universe, we find ourselves
facing a phenomenon to which we attribute not only relative
and thus scientifically calculable greatness or power but also
absolute, incomparable greatness or power, then, in Kant’s
terminology, we can call this “sublime,” in Schleiermacher’s,
“God” or, in Tugendhat’s, something that can only be
experienced “mystically.”[32] Mysticism, religion, and
aesthetics compete with each other for metaphysical
supremacy and it seems clear to me which of the three we, as
the grandchildren of Modernism, should give precedence
to.[33]
Avatar, in contrast, shows no trace of this aesthetic holism.
Instead of aesthetic construction, the film relies on, first,
technological invention, namely 3-D cinema, and, secondly, on
an ambiguous narrative, equally dowdy and renewable. The
technologically perfected cinema of immersion becomes an
ethical model for our relationship with nature. It opens up a
perspective on nature as a para-intelligent hyperorganism,
networking itself according to the pattern of neuronal
structures, and thus interfaces an ethics of affiliation, a
mimetically-communicative ethics. Behind this is, of course, a
technological utopia. The same technology that until now has
destroyed nature exploitatively and stripped it of its ability to
symbolize a supernatural order could make way for a more
subtle, more sophisticated, unimaginably “more intelligent”
technology.
Nobody familiar with the factual, detached, clarifying and
enlightening power of reasonable thought will claim that the
way of life of the native-Americans or African tribes could
provide a social model for the future. But this way of life does
have an anamnetic and maybe even heuristic value in that it

reminds us that what we call nature, or life, or reality, or
being, could actually be structured in a different way from
what we have assumed to date. What at first appears to be
theoretical nonsense or provocation can, in fact, lead
anywhere, we just do not know where. Compared to all the
supersized, roaring, clattering machines and stomping steel
robots (in which military masculinity can have a field day) this
equally trivial and evident allegory of destructive technology in
Avatar allows us once more to visualize that it is easy to
prefer the refined, filigree, and more sophisticated technology
of the so-called primitives. Lyotard’s postmodernism and its
corresponding concept of an avant-garde art of the sublime
was anti-utopian. In contrast, the new holistic worldview
returns to an ethical and implicitly utopian core: everything
ought to be connected and interactive!
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